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CEO tenure and corporate misconduct: evidence from US banks 
 
Abstract 
 
We test for a link between CEO tenure and misconduct by US banks. Banks are more likely to 
commit misconduct when CEOs have a relatively long tenure and banks have relatively poor 
balance sheets; however, independent corporate boards can mitigate some types of misconduct. 
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1. Introduction 
The trend in enforcements by US bank regulators since the late 1990s suggests that banks are 
serious and growing perpetrators of corporate misconduct. This is of concern for several reasons. 
First, effective financial intermediation needs savers and investors to have confidence in the 
integrity of financial institutions and markets; if that confidence is damaged, financial 
intermediation is likely to be lower than would otherwise be the case, with possible adverse 
consequences for the real economy (Levine, 2005). Second, financial misconduct may weaken 
banks and, if the banks are especially large, there may be adverse implications for the stability of 
the national banking system with possible cross-border spill-over effects. A case in point is 
Deutsche Bank with widespread press reports in September 2016 that the US Department of Justice 
was seeking a $14 billion civil settlement for the bank allegedly selling toxic mortgage-backed 
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securities; the fine was equivalent to about four-fifths of the bank’s market capitalization raising 
doubts about the future viability of the Bank and the systemic consequences should it fail (see, for 
example, Stewart 2016). Separately, in a letter to the G-20 Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
dated August 30, 2016, Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England wrote that “The 
incidence of financial sector misconduct has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic 
risk.” Third, firms that engage in corporate misconduct experience significant losses in shareholder 
value and performance (Baucus and Baucus, 1997; Davidson and Worrell, 1988; Palmrose at al., 
2004), diminished expectations of earnings and subsequent increases in the cost of capital (Hribar 
and Jenkins, 2004). 
A large empirical literature on the causes and consequences of corporate misconduct is rooted in 
Becker’s (1968) view that economic agents engage in crime when the expected benefits of doing 
so outweigh the expected costs. Much of that literature has been concerned with the circumstances 
that can affect those benefits and costs. Cumming et al. (2015) group the literature into three 
themes: studies of the circumstances that provide opportunities to commit and benefit from 
misconduct (e.g. under the cover of accounting scandals and M&A announcements, and around 
the time of option expiry); studies of external factors that impact on the incentives to engage in 
misconduct (e.g. regulatory enforcement, corporate lobbying, strong auditors and analysts); and 
studies of internal governance factors that can exacerbate or mitigate the ability to commit 
misconduct (e.g. promotion-based financial incentives, and board guidance). In the latter group, a 
still developing area of research focuses on the impact of CEOs on corporate misconduct and 
stresses the incentives stemming from firm ownership structure, CEO compensation and CEO 
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turnover.1 One thread of it focuses on the CEO as a deterrent to corporate misconduct because the 
penalties involved for CEOs if the misconduct is discovered, including the likelihood of job loss, 
financial penalties and jail time, with these probabilities increasing as the cost of the misconduct 
increases for shareholders (Karpoff et al., 2008); CEO turnover also seems to be more likely 
following contractual lawsuits against the firm (Aharony et al., 2015), and in response to 
aggressive earnings management (Hazarika, et al., 2012). 
A second a thread looks at the incentives for CEOs to be instigators of corporate misconduct. For 
example, Alexander and Cohen (1999) examine the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate misconduct and find that it occurs less frequently among firms in which management 
has a larger ownership stake, which supports the hypothesis that misconduct reflects an agency 
cost. Armstrong and Jagolinzer (2010) examine whether CEO equity-based holdings and 
compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports but find little evidence that this 
is the case. Chan et al. (2015) explore the association between different types of executive 
perquisites and the likelihood of financial fraud and find that granting financial and severance 
perks to CEOs helps alleviate commission of fraud. Hass et al. (2015) find that the relative 
performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments results in a higher likelihood of 
CEO misconduct. Finally, Khanna et al. (2015) report that the connections CEOs develop with top 
executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud 
and decreases the likelihood of detection, including by helping conceal fraudulent activity, which 
                                                 
1 In a recent survey, Cumming et al. (2017) state that corporate misconduct has most often been 
studied in the context of financial regulation and only more recently in the context of ownership 
structure, CEO equity incentives and CEO turnover.  
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makes CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery and lowers the coordination costs of carrying out 
illegal activity.  
In this paper, we add to this second thread of the literature on the role of CEOs by identifying an 
additional important factor that can magnify the risk of corporate fraud—namely the length of a 
CEO’s tenure, which we take as a proxy for a CEO’s power within the firm. A quite large empirical 
literature already attests to the impact of powerful CEO’s on firm performance, including by 
impacting adversely on financial performance (Adams et al. 2005; Veprauskaite and Adams 2013), 
increasing the likelihood of the firm engaging in earnings management (Ali and Zhang 2015), 
driving corporate acquisitions (Brown and Sartma 2007; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008), influencing the composition of boards of directors to prevent a dilution of 
CEO power (Combs et al., 2007), shaping incentive contract design to their own advantage (Morse 
et al., 2011), and that more CEO power tends to be associated with lower credit ratings of a firm’s 
debt (Liu and Jiraporn 2010). With this evidence in mind, we take the view expressed by Khanna 
et al. (2014) that corporate misconduct may be another potential outcome when a CEO has too 
much authority within the firm. We view CEO power as increasing with length of tenure because 
tenure builds decision-making autonomy (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Combs et al., 2007) and 
examine the role of CEO tenure in the likelihood of banks engaging in corporate misconduct. 
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature on corporate misconduct in banking. First, 
we contribute to the debate on governance and risk-taking in the banking industry (e.g. Beltratti 
and Stulz, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton et al., 2014) by providing the first empirical 
work (we believe) that studies the role of CEO tenure as a determinant of misconduct by banks. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the determinants and economics of corporate misconduct 
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by demonstrating that powerful CEOs can overcome the moderating influence of boards of 
directors, which contrasts with previous work that has linked misconduct to a lack of board 
monitoring (e.g., Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Khanna et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2016). Finally, 
we contribute to the literature on CEO power more generally, which shows that CEOs can affect 
many aspects of firm performance and behaviour (as discussed above).   
2. Model and Data 
 
For our empirical estimates, we employ a firm clustered probit model to estimate the likelihood 
of a corporate misconduct having been committed (conditional on detection of the conduct) as 
follows: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 +𝛽5𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 
                               𝛽7𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
                               𝛽13𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +𝛽15𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (1) 
 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the presence of corporate misconduct and 
𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡, is CEO tenure in number of years. The remaining independent variables are commonly 
used in estimates of corporate misconduct in the literature cited above. They are the CEO 
characteristics of age, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡, gender, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡, job experience, 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡, and education level, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡; 
the corporate governance indicators of board size, 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡, and board composition between 
outside and inside directors, 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡; and bank-specific balance sheet variables, including 
leverage, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡, return on assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡, liquidity, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡, asset quality, 𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡, the capital-asset 
ratio, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡, the cost-to-income ratio, 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡, and bank size, 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡. Finally, we include a 0-1 
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dummy to control for the impact of the of the 2008-10 financial crisis on corporate misconduct. 
The definitions of the variables are present in the Appendix. 
 
Our corporate misconduct variable comprises regulatory enforcements and class action litigation 
against publicly listed US banks. We compile data from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System Enforcement Action database; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
Enforcement Actions database; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Enforcement Decisions 
and Orders database; Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse Filings 
database; and Office of Thrift Supervision Enforcement Order Archive. For the 960 publicly listed 
banks for which we have data, our search revealed 867 litigation cases involving 340 banks over 
1998-2015. Figure 1 shows the trend in the data: enforcements were on a rising trend throughout 
the period, peaked sharply during the 2007-10 financial crisis and, though they fell back thereafter, 
were still well above their levels of the late 1990s by the end of the period. Many banks in the 
sample were repeat offenders, with about half of them facing more than one enforcement action 
and a quarter of them facing at least two such actions. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Table 1 reports the bank-clustered marginal effects of probit estimates of the likelihood of 
corporate misconduct. The results in column 1 confirm that the likelihood of misconduct is greater 
if the CEO has a relatively long tenure, with the coefficient positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The point estimates indicate that the influence of CEO tenure on the probability of a 
bank committing a crime is about 13%. Misconduct is also more likely when the CEO is older, has 
 8 
had previous experience in the industry, and is relatively well educated. The sign and size of the 
coefficients on the governance variables indicate that board size and independence suggest that 
only the former has a mitigating role with respect to offset the adverse impact of CEO tenure. The 
bank specific variables suggest that crime is more likely in banks that are more highly leveraged, 
less well-capitalized, less efficient, and relatively large. which is larger than the marginal effects 
of the bank specific variables with the exceptions of asset quality and bank size. To shed some 
light on the mitigating role of board size, the estimate reported in column 2 includes the interaction 
of the CEO tenure and board size: the sign is negative but not significant and the sum of the 
coefficients on CEO tenure and the interaction term attests to the domination of CEO power over 
board size. In columns 3 and 4, we examine whether our results are driven by the banks that are 
serial offenders—i.e. in these estimates, the sample of banks is limited to those that have been 
prosecuted for misconduct on more than one occasion and we are testing the effect of CEO tenure 
on the likelihood of misconduct if the tendency to engage in these activities is continuous.2 For 
example, Dorminey et al. (2012) point out that repeated fraud makes the offender de-sensitized 
such that misconduct becomes more continuous in time. The results suggest that CEO tenure is an 
important determinant of continuous bank misconduct with board size again playing a mitigating 
but not offsetting role; the statistical significance of coefficients on the remaining variables is 
broadly in line with the estimates reported in columns 1 and 2. 
 
It might be the case that CEO power is more important for some forms of misconduct than for 
others—for example, if powerful CEOs have less room for maneuver in some areas of bank 
                                                 
2 In this sample, there are 300 banks that were involved in misconduct on more than one 
occasion. 
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business. For example, Nguyen et al. (2016) suggest that the advice of boards of directors might 
be particularly relevant for technical types of fraud (e.g. banking practices) and less relevant for 
non-technical misconduct (e.g. money laundering). To test for this possibility, we re-estimate the 
probit model separately for technical and non-technical misconduct as defined in Table 2. The 
estimations are reported in Table 3 and suggest that CEO tenure is highly important in both 
categories of misconduct. The coefficients on the board size and the interaction variables again 
suggest that board size does not mitigate CEO power in either type of misconduct. In contrast, 
board independence would appear to be able to play this role in the case of nontechnical 
misconduct, where the negative and significant coefficients on board composition are larger than 
the positive coefficient on the CEO tenure. 
 
Misconduct detection vs. misconduct commission  
 
A common objection to the standard probit model is that it fails to address the ‘partial observability 
problem’ because it treats the probability of detecting corporate misconduct as the probability of 
misconduct taking place. If the detection process is not perfect (i.e. not all misconduct is detected), 
then the probability of detected conduct will be different from the probability of misconduct taking 
place. To address the partial observability problem, we follow Wang (2013), Wang et al. (2010), 
and Nguyen et al. (2015) and use a bivariate probit model that separates committing misconduct 
from the detection of misconduct conditional upon misconduct having occurred.3  
                                                 
3 An alternative approach suggested by Cumming et al. (2016) is to use logs to deal with the 
partial observability problem. 
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Our specification for the bivariate model contains a set of variables that influence a bank’s 
incentive to engage in misconduct but not the likelihood that misconduct will be detected, and a 
set of variables that affect the bank’s incentives to commit wrongdoing and the likelihood of 
detection. In the first set, we include CEO tenure, and the other CEO characteristics, governance 
and bank specific variables included in equation (1). In the second set, we include variables to 
capture the likelihood of a misconduct being detected. Following Wang et al., (2010) and Wang 
(2013), the variables are the growth of bank assets, the abnormal return on assets, an adverse shock 
to stock prices, stock price volatility, and abnormal stock turnover.4  In general, developments in 
these variables are expected to alert regulators as to the likelihood of misconduct having taken 
place. The bivariate results are reported in Table 4 for all banks, repeat offender banks, and for 
technical and non-technical misconduct. They confirm that misconduct is more likely to be 
detected in banks with long-tenured CEOs, with the coefficient on the variable positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimates. In these estimates, both board size and 
board independence play a role in mitigating the impact of powerful CEOs—in particular, the 
negative coefficient on board independence in each case is larger than the positive coefficient on 
CEO tenure. Several of the bank specific controls are also statistically significant and suggest that 
detecting misconduct is more likely in banks that are highly leveraged, illiquid, less well-
capitalized, less efficient, and are relatively large. Of the crime detection variables, only asset 
growth and abnormal stock volatility provide significant results, with increases in both suggesting 
a greater likelihood that misconduct will be detected.  
 
4. Conclusions 
                                                 
4 Definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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Enforcement actions against US banks have been on a rising trend since the late 1990s. We find 
that the likelihood that a bank will engage in misconduct increases if the CEO is relatively 
powerful, as measured by greater length of tenure, and if the bank is relatively large, less efficient, 
less well capitalized and has relatively poor asset quality. However, for some types of crime the 
adverse impact of CEO power can be mitigated by independent boards. Our results suggest that 
CEO tenure warrants the attention of bank regulators, investors, and corporate governance 
specialists, especially when boards of directors are not independent. 
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Table 1 
Probit estimates of the likelihood that a crime will be committed 
 All banks All banks with 
interactions 
Repeat offender 
banks 
Repeat offender 
banks with 
interactions 
CEO tenure   0.135*** 
 (0.008) 
  0.147*** 
 (0.059) 
  0.062*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.220*** 
 (0.050) 
CEO age   0.280*** 
 (0.062) 
  0.236*** 
 (0.062) 
  0.052 
 (0.055) 
  0.023 
 (0.054) 
CEO gender   0.000 
 (0.039) 
 -0.001 
 (0.039) 
 -0.033 
 (0.032) 
 -0.051* 
 (0.030) 
CEO experience   0.020** 
 (0.007) 
  0.016** 
 (0.007) 
  0.026* 
 (0.006) 
  0.023** 
 (0.007) 
CEO education   0.504*** 
 (0.016) 
  0.051** 
 (0.0 
 -0.023 
 (0.014) 
  0.023* 
 (0.006) 
Bank board size  -0.009*** 
 (0.003) 
 -0.006* 
 (0.004) 
 -0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
  0.001 
 (0.003) 
Bank board independence  -0.006 
 (0.068) 
 -0.082 
 (0.066) 
 -0.012 
 (0.057) 
 -0.066 
 (0.055) 
CEO tenure*board size   -0.005 
 (0.025) 
  -0.066*** 
 (0.021) 
Bank leverage   0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.002** 
 (0.001) 
  0.001 
 (0.001) 
Bank return on assets   0.008 
 (0.007) 
  0.012* 
 (0.007) 
  0.014** 
 (0.006) 
  0.015** 
 (0.006) 
Bank liquidity  -0.001 
 (0.001) 
 -0.001 
 (0.001) 
 -0.001 
 (0.001) 
 -0.001 
 (0.001) 
Bank loan provisions   0.133*** 
 (0.020) 
  0.124*** 
 (0.020) 
  0.074** 
 (0.017) 
  0.072*** 
 (0.017) 
Bank capital-asset ratio  -0.020*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.023*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.012*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.023*** 
 (0.002) 
Bank cost-income ratio   0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Bank assets   0.125*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.119*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.091*** 
 (0.005) 
  0.087*** 
  (0.005) 
Financial crisis dummy 0.061*** 
(0.018) 
  0.061*** 
 (0.018) 
0.032* 
(0.016) 
  0.030** 
 (0.015) 
Observations  5144   5144  4302   4302 
Log-likelihood -2977.72  -2995.11 -1908.64 -1916.47 
Psuedo R2   0.165    0.161   0.184   0.182 
The table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. The sample is 1998 to 2015. All regressions include year 
dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Classification and the number of misconduct cases of publicly listed US banks, 1998–2015 
Panel A. Technical misconduct, total      275 
  Loan loss reserve failure        88 
  Unsafe and unsound banking practice      187 
Panel B. Non-technical misconduct, total      592 
  Material omission, misstatement, misrepresentation, 
  incompliance and reclassification 
 
       50 
  Information disclosure failure        67 
  Managerial misconduct      167 
  Money laundering        83 
  Related party transaction failure        90 
Total misconduct (Panel A + Panel B)      867 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED) Enforcement Action 
database (https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/search.aspx); the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) Enforcement Actions database 
(http://apps.occ.gov/EASearch/); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
Enforcement Decisions and Orders database (https://www5.fdic.gov/edo/DataPresentation.html);  
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) Enforcement Order Archive 
(https://www.occ.treas.gov/static/ots/enforcement/ots-enforcement-order-listing.xlsx); and the 
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) Filings Database 
(http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html).   
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Table 3 
Probit estimates of the likelihood of technical and nontechnical misconduct by US banks 
 Technical misconduct  Nontechnical misconduct 
CEO tenure   0.131*** 
 (0.009) 
  0.291*** 
 (0.064) 
  0.130*** 
 (0.009) 
  0.122* 
 (0.066) 
CEO age   0.298*** 
 (0.064) 
  0.269*** 
 (0.064) 
  0.177** 
 (0.068) 
  0.133** 
 (0.068) 
CEO gender   0.016 
 (0.040) 
  0.013 
 (0.040) 
 -0.012 
 (0.043) 
 -0.014 
 (0.044) 
CEO experience   0.018** 
 (0.007) 
  0.015* 
 (0.007) 
  0.033** 
 (0.008) 
  0.029*** 
 (0.007) 
CEO education   0.037** 
 (0.016) 
  0.034** 
 (0.016) 
  0.042** 
 (0.017) 
  0.039** 
 (0.017) 
Bank board size  -0.007*** 
 (0.003) 
  0.003 
 (0.004) 
 -0.013*** 
 (0.003) 
 -0.011*** 
 (0.004) 
Bank board independence   0.094 
 (0.071) 
  0.045 
 (0.069) 
 -0.153** 
 (0.074) 
 -0.266*** 
 (0.072) 
CEO tenure*board size   -0.068** 
 (0.027) 
   0.003 
 (0.028) 
Bank leverage   0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Bank return on assets   0.003 
 (0.007) 
  0.007 
 (0.007) 
  0.014* 
 (0.008) 
  0.017** 
 (0.008) 
Bank liquidity  -0.002** 
 (0.001) 
 -0.002** 
 (0.001) 
 -0.001* 
 (0.001) 
  0.001* 
 (0.001) 
Bank loan provisions   0.134*** 
 (0.020) 
  0.125*** 
 (0.020) 
  0.093** 
 (0.023) 
  0.087*** 
 (0.023) 
Bank capital-asset ratio  -0.020*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.022*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.020*** 
 (0.003) 
 -0.023*** 
 (0.002) 
Bank cost-income ratio   0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.002** 
 (0.000) 
  0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.001** 
 (0.000) 
Bank assets   0.093*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.085*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.149*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.145*** 
 (0.007) 
Financial crisis dummy 0.051*** 
(0.019) 
  0.049** 
 (0.019) 
0.059*** 
(0.020) 
  0.060*** 
 (0.020) 
Observations  4085  4085  4302  4302 
Log-likelihood -2312.55 -2323.59 -2264.95 -2277.09 
Psuedo R2   0.138   0.135   0.217   0.213 
Technical and nontechnical misconduct is defined in Table 2.  
The table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. The sample is 1998 to 2015. All 
regressions include year dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Bivariate probit estimates of the likelihood a crime will be detected 
 All crimes and all 
banks 
Repeated crimes 
in all banks 
Technical crimes 
in all banks 
Nontechnical 
crimes in all 
banks 
CEO tenure   0.122*** 
 (0.012) 
0.061*** 
(0.008) 
  0.133*** 
 (0.011) 
  0.154*** 
 (0.011) 
CEO age   0.615*** 
 (0.184) 
-0.408*** 
(0.073) 
  0.454*** 
 (0.086) 
  0.334* 
 (0.166) 
CEO gender  -0.070 
 (0.055) 
0.135*** 
(0.050) 
  0.088 
 (0.065) 
  0.167*** 
 (0.056) 
CEO experience  -0.006 
 (0.012) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
  0.001 
 (0.001) 
  0.028*** 
 (0.010) 
CEO education   0.0112*** 
 (0.033) 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
  0.045* 
 (0.023) 
  0.023 
 (0.026) 
Bank board size  -0.021*** 
 (0.008) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.019*** 
 (0.006) 
  0.003 
 (0.007) 
Bank board independence  -0.207** 
 (0.087) 
0.089 
 (0.063) 
 -0.197* 
 (0.104) 
 -0.185* 
 (0.099) 
Bank leverage   0.003** 
 (0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
  0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.007*** 
 (0.002) 
Bank return on assets   0.003 
 (0.009) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
  0.002 
 (0.010) 
  0.028*** 
 (0.010) 
Bank liquidity  -0.002* 
 (0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.004*** 
 (0.010) 
Bank loan provisions   0.158*** 
 (0.043) 
0.039** 
(0.02) 
  0.236*** 
 (0.045) 
  0.080*** 
 (0.028) 
Bank capital-asset ratio  -0.022*** 
 (0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.018*** 
 (0.003) 
 -0.016*** 
 (0.003) 
Bank cost-income ratio   0.000 
 (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  0.000 
 (0.001) 
  0.001** 
 (0.000) 
Bank assets   0.122*** 
 (0.001) 
0.087*** 
(0.006) 
  0.130*** 
 (0.012) 
  0.155*** 
 (0.011) 
Asset growth   0.001** 
 (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
  0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.001 
 (0.001) 
Abnormal return on assets  -0.004 
 (0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
 -0.016** 
 (0.007) 
  0.001 
 (0.007) 
Adverse stock prices   0.032 
 (0.022) 
0.084*** 
(0.030) 
  0.098** 
 (0.038) 
  0.048 
 (0.030) 
Abnormal stock turnover  -0.009 
 (0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
  -0.054*** 
 (0.014) 
 -0.000 
 (0.014) 
Abnormal stock volatility   0.023*** 
 (0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
  0.029** 
 (0.012) 
  0.038*** 
 (0.012) 
Financial crisis dummy -0.139*** 
(0.050) 
 0.025*** 
(0.069) 
  0.051 
 (0.064) 
  0.483*** 
 (0.111) 
Observations   4622 4400  3761  3840 
Log-likelihood  -2662.85 -2006.28 -2039.91 -2037.75 
Wald Chi2   903.33 598.17   555.95   888.32 
The table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. The sample is 1998 to 2015. All regressions include year 
dummies. Robust standard errors are clustered at bank level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
Data sources and variable definitions 
Variables Source Description 
CEO tenure BoardEx The number of years the CEO has served in position at given year. 
CEO age BoardEx The age of the CEO at given year. 
CEO gender BoardEx Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and otherwise 0. 
CEO experience BoardEx The number of years the CEO has served in the same entity at given year. 
CEO education BoardEx Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO holds at least a post-graduate level degree 
Board size BoardEx The number of directors sitting on the board at given year. 
Board independence BoardEx The percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board at given year. 
Leverage Call reports  The ratio of total book value of liabilities to total assets at given year. 
Return on assets Call reports  The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (to book value of total assets at given year. 
Liquidity Call reports  The ratio of liquid assets to total assets at given year. 
Loan provisions Call reports  The ratio of loan loss provision to total loans at given year. 
Capital-asset ratio Call reports  The ratio of risk-weighted capital to total assets at given year. 
Cost-to-income ratio Call reports  The ratio of operating expenses to total operating income at given year. 
Total assets Call reports  Natural logarithm of total assets at given year. 
Asset growth Bloomberg  The annual percentage change on total assets. 
Abnormal ROA Bloomberg  Residual of the regression: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−2 + 𝜀. 
Adverse stock price 
Bloomberg  Binary variable that equals to 1 if annual stock price is below -20% or in the bottom 10% of stocks in 
sample of publicly listed banks. 
Abnormal stock turnover Bloomberg  The demeaned average monthly stock turnover at given year. 
Abnormal stock volatility Bloomberg  The demeaned standard deviation of the monthly change in the stock price of a bank each year. 
Financial crisis dummy Authors’ calculation  Binary variable that equals to 1 in financial crisis years 2008-2010. 
 
 
 
  
  
